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Since the Japanese doomsday cult Aum
Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas on the Tokyo
subway in March 1995, killing 12 people,
terrorist incidents and hoaxes involving toxic or
infectious agents have been on the rise. Before
the late 1990s, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) typically investigated a
dozen cases per year involving the acquisition or
use of chemical, biological, radiologic, or nuclear
materials; however, FBI opened 74 such
investigations in 1997 and 181 in 1998 (1).
Although 80% of these incidents have been
hoaxes, some were unsuccessful attacks (2).
The vulnerability of civilian populations to
chemical, biological, radiologic, or nuclear
terrorism has been widely discussed, but
information on historical cases is anecdotal and
often inaccurate (3). Without a realistic threat
assessment based on solid empirical data,
government policymakers lack the knowledge
they need to design prudent and cost-effective
programs for preventing or mitigating future
incidents.
Responding to this knowledge gap, the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonprolifera-
tion Project at the Monterey Institutes Center
for Nonproliferation Studies has compiled an
open-source database of all publicly known cases
from 1900 to the present in which domestic or
international criminals or terrorists sought to
acquire or use chemical, biological, radiologic, or
nuclear materials. As of January 31, 1999, the
database contained 415 incidents, both domestic
and international. Each entry draws on multiple
sources and includes a detailed description of the
event and a list of citations.
The project has conducted a preliminary
analysis of the data to discern patterns over time
in the frequency of such incidents, the
underlying motives, and the choice of agent and
target. The ultimate goal is to identify which
types of individuals or groups are most likely to
acquire and use toxic or infectious materials and
for what purposes.
Since the Monterey Database has been
compiled from journalistic accounts and other
unclassified sources, it may not be comprehen-
sive or fully accurate. Incidents have been
recorded only if they came to the attention of law
enforcement or the news media, so the database
does not include events that were not detected or
whose existence remains secret. Despite these
limitations, the information in the database
indicates trends and patterns of behavior that
may assist intelligence and law-enforcement
personnel in focusing their monitoring efforts.
Database Findings
Most of the incidents in the Monterey
Database involve chemical or biological agents
rather than radiologic or nuclear materials
(Figure 1). The cases have been divided into
three categories: terrorist events, criminal
events, and state-sponsored assassinations. To
be classified as a terrorist event, an incident
must involve an organization or person that
conspires to use violence instrumentally to
Figure 1. Overall database: Distribution of incident
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advance a political, ideologic, or religious goal.
Criminal incidents, in contrast, involve extor-
tion, murder, or some other nonpolitical
objective. Of the 415 incidents involving
chemical, biological, radiologic, or nuclear
materials, 151 cases are terrorist events for
which information is sufficient to permit cross-
case comparison. These incidents have been
classified according to type of agent, event,
target, motive, and group (Figure 2).
Type of event includes the following
categories: 1) conspiracy to acquire and use an
agent, 2) attempted acquisition, 3) possession,
4) threatened use, 5) actual use, and 6) hoax or
prank. Most of the 151 incidents involve
threatened or actual use, although rarely with
the intent of inflicting mass casualties. Of the
151 terrorist incidents, a subset of 33 involves
biological agents (22 alleged biological cases were
dropped from the analysis because they lacked
key pieces of information). Many of the
biological-agent cases are hoaxes.
Since 1985, the number of terrorist incidents
involving the threatened or actual use of
chemical, biological, radiologic, or nuclear
materials has risen sharply; a more modest
increase has occurred in efforts to acquire such
agents. When criminal and terrorist incidents
involving chemical or biological agents are
examined, two large peaks become apparent
(Figure 3a). The 1995 peak was associated
primarily with Aum Shinrikyo and related
Figure 2. Standardized typology used in analysis of politically or ideologically motivated incidents.
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copycat attacks in Japan; in 1998, incidents of
actual use again increased abruptly (Figure 3a).
Hoaxes involving chemical or biological
agents have shown two peaks in frequency over
the past 30 years (Figure 3b). The 1986 peak in
chemical hoaxes was inspired by the second
series of Tylenol poisonings, while the dramatic
rise in biological hoaxes in 1998 is attributable to
the flurry of anthrax threats in the United
States. The first wave of anthrax hoaxes followed
the well-publicized arrest on February 18, 1998,
of Larry Wayne Harris, a microbiologist linked to
white-supremacist groups, after he allegedly
threatened to release military-grade anthrax
in Las Vegas (4). Although Harriss anthrax
turned out to be a harmless veterinary vaccine
strain, sensational media coverage appears to
have had the unintended effect of popularizing
this agent among potential perpetrators.
The categories of terrorist organizations
involved in the acquisition and use of chemical,
biological, radiologic, or nuclear materials have
changed over time. Omitting incidents involving
lone terrorists, recent years have seen a rise in
cases involving three types of terrorist organiza-
tions: single-issue groups such as those dealing
with abortion and animal rights; nationalist and
separatist groups such as Chechen rebel
organizations, the Kurdistan Workers Party,
and the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka; and
Figure 3. (A) Actual chemical and biological incidents vs. hoaxes, 19601998 (278 cases). (B) Chemical and
biological hoaxes over time, 19601998 (93 cases: 43 chemical, 50 biological).
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apocalyptic religious cults such as Aum
Shinrikyo (although Aum accounts for nearly all
the latter cases). No clear pattern is apparent in
the types of groups involved in biological
incidents, although religious fundamentalism as
a motivation has emerged within the past 5 years.
The preferred choice of target has also
changed over time. If one examines 135 terrorist
incidents for which the target is known, two
types of targets have increased in frequency: the
general civilian population (with the apparent
intent of inflicting indiscriminate casualties) and
a symbolic building or organization.
Motivations for the terrorist use of chemical,
biological, radiologic, or nuclear materials
appear to encompass a wide range of objectives.
(For each case, two analysts separately
determined the best fit to a menu of
motivations.) In descending order, the main
motivations are: 1) to promote nationalist or
separatist objectives; 2) to retaliate or take
revenge for a real or perceived injury; 3) to
protest government policies; and 4) to defend
animal rights (Figure 4). A similar breakdown of
motivations is found in the incidents involving
biological agents, except for the greater
prominence of apocalyptic prophecy (Figure 5).
Nearly all the latter cases are linked to Aum
Shinrikyo, which may be either an outlier or a
trend-setter.
Figure 4. Distribution of motivations for chemical and biological terrorism incidents, 1960Jan. 31, 1999 (147
cases).
Figure 5. Distribution of motivations for biological terrorism incidents, 1960Jan. 31, 1999 (33 cases).
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Table 1. Comparison of Values Across Selected Bioterrorist Incidents
Case Motivation/Objective Ideology Target(s) Agent(s) Delivery Outcome
Weather Temporarily incapacitate Revolutionary Urban Reportedly Reportedly Report
Underground U.S. cities to movement op- populations sought to ob- planned to originated with
(1970) demonstrate posed to Ameri- in the tain agents at put incapacita- U.S. Customs
impotence of the can imperialism United Ft. Detrick ting CW/BW informant;
federal government and the States by blackmail agents in ur- case probably
Vietnam War of gay soldier ban water apocryphal
R.I.S.E. (1972) Kill off most of humanity Perpetrators Initially Eight micro- Planned BW Attack aborted
to prevent the destruc- were college entire world bial pathogens aerosol when cultures
tion of nature, then start students population, including attacks were
human race over with a influenced by later nar- agents of (dispersed by discovered; the
select few ecoterrorist rowed to resi- typhoid fever, aircraft) and two main
ideology and dents of five diphtheria, contamination perpetrators
1960s drug states around dysentery, and of urban water then fled to
culture Chicago meningitis supplies Cuba
Red Army Allegedly planned BW Marxist- Specific Group mem- Unknown Probably an
Faction (1980) attacks against West revolutionary targets ber allegedly erroneous
German officials and ideology unknown cultivated botu- report, later
business leaders linum toxin in a repudiated by
Paris safe-house German gov-
ernment (BKA)
Rajneeshee Scheme to incapacitate Indian reli- Residents Salmonella Multiple Plot revealed
Cult (1984) voters to win local gious cult of the town Typhimurium methods, when the cult
election, seize political headed by a of The Dalles mainly con- collapsed and
control of county charismatic and Wasco tamination of members
guru County, restaurant turned
Oregon salad bars informant
Minnesota Cause harm to Anti-govern- IRS offi- Ricin Planned to Group was
Patriots the federal govern- ment tax cials, U.S. extracted deliver ricin penetrated
Council (1991) ment, obtain personal protesters; deputy mar- from castor through skin by FBI
revenge right-wing shal, local beans with DMSO informants;
patriot law enforce- obtained by and aloe vera, four key
movement ment mail-order or as dry members
officials aerosol arrested
Aum Shinrikyo Prove an apocalyptic New Age Mass Biological Attempted on Multiple
(1995) prophecy, eliminate doomsday civilian agents at least 10 CW attacks
enemies and rivals, cult seeking populations, (anthrax, occasions to (in Matsumoto,
halt an adverse court to establish individual botulinum disperse BW Tokyo, and
ruling, seize control a theocratic opponents toxin, Q fever agents in assassination
of Japanese government state in Japan, of cult, Ebola virus) aerosol form; campaign)
with a charis- judges ruling and chemical all known killed at least
matic, power- against and agents (sarin, attacks failed 20 people and
hungry leader police inves- VX, hydrogen injured more
tigating cult cyanide) than 1,000
Larry Wayne To alert Americans to Links to Made vague Obtained Discussed Arrested when
Harris (1998) the Iraqi BW threat; Christian threats plague and the dissemi- he talked
seeks separate Identity and against U.S. anthrax (vac- nation of openly about
homeland for whites white federal offi- cine strain), BW agents BW terrorism
in the United States supremacist cials on be- reportedly with crop- and made
groups (e.g., half of right- isolated seve- duster aircraft threatening
the Aryan wing patriot ral other and other remarks to
Nation) groups bacteria methods U.S. officials
BW, biological weapons; CW, chemical weapons; DMSO, dimethylsulfoxide; IRS, Internal Revenue Service; FBI, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
The motivations underlying terrorist inci-
dents with chemical, biological, radiologic, or
nuclear materials appear to have shifted over
time. The predominant motivation from 1975 to
1989 was to protest government policies. Since
1990, however, the leading motivations have
been to further nationalist or separatist
objectives and for retaliation or revenge. In 1993,
because of Aum Shinrikyo, apocalyptic prophecy
also emerged as an important motivation. The
prominence of these three motivations becomes
even greater when only incidents involving
biological agents are examined.
In addition to compiling the incidents
database, the project commissioned historical
case studies of seven terrorist groups or
individuals that acquired or employed biological
agents (Table 1). Two of the cases appear to be
apocryphal, but the five confirmed cases share a
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of groups and individuals most likely to engage
in bioterrorism (Table 2). These characteristics
include diffuse objectives, a sense of grandiosity,
and a paranoid, conspiratorial, or apocalyptic
world view that may lead to defensive
aggression. Such terrorists also lack a domestic
political constituency that might restrain them
from engaging in indiscriminate violence.
Religiously motivated cults such as Aum
Shinrikyo and the Rajneeshees are cut off from
the outside world and are often guided by a
charismatic, all-powerful leader, making them
less subject to societal norms. Other factors not
listed in the table include a tendency to escalate
terrorist violence over time and to use innovative
weapons and tactics.
Conclusions
The Monterey Database indicates that
incidents involving biological agents have been
quite rare, with 66 criminal events and 55
terrorist events over the 40-year period from
1960 to 1999, although the frequency of such
incidents (mainly hoaxes) has increased sharply
in recent years. The historical record includes
few cases in which criminals or terrorists sought
to inflict mass casualties with biological agents,
and none in which they succeeded. Only eight
criminal attacks with biological agents led to
casualties, inflicting a total of 29 deaths and 31
injuries. Of the terrorist attacks with biological
agents, only one resulted in casualties: the use by
the Rajneeshee cult in 1984 of Salmonella
Typhimurium bacteria to contaminate restau-
Table 2. Selected Motivational Factors Associated with Bioterrorism
Loner or    Sense of
Charismatic  No outside Apocalyptic splinter paranoia and Defensive
Cases   leadership constituency   ideology   group   grandiosity aggression
R.I.S.E. X X X X X
Rajneeshee Cult X X X X X
Minnesota Patriots X X X X X X
Council
Aum Shinrikyo X X X X X
Larry Wayne Harris X X X X X
Apparently
Apocryphal
Cases
  Weather Underground X X
  Red Army Faction X X
rant salad bars in The Dalles, Oregon. This event
caused 751 cases of food poisoning, none fatal (5).
Incidents of bioterrorism in the Monterey
Database are extremely diverse in terms of type
of group and motivation. The trend in recent
years has been away from left-wing terrorism
and toward nationalist-separatist groups and
individuals or ad hoc groups bent on revenge.
There has also been an apparent rise in incidents
perpetrated by violent sects or cults that believe
in apocalyptic prophecy.
Even if the motivation to inflict mass
casualties exists, however, few terrorist groups
possess the scientific-technical resources re-
quired for the successful large-scale release of a
biological agent. Aum Shinrikyo, which had
considerable wealth and scientific expertise,
failed in 10 separate attempts to carry out open-
air attacks against urban targets with aero-
solized anthrax spores or botulinum toxin (6).
In summary, the historical record suggests
that future incidents of bioterrorism will
probably involve hoaxes and relatively small-
scale attacks, such as food contamination.
Nevertheless, the diffusion of dual-use technolo-
gies relevant to the production of biological and
toxin agents, and the potential availability of
scientists and engineers formerly employed in
sophisticated biological warfare programs such
as those of the Soviet Union and South Africa,
suggest that the technical barriers to mass-
casualty terrorism are eroding.504 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 4, JulyAugust 1999
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